A judgment can tell the court more than just what was decided between the parties to it. When it concerns a matter of public nature — the existence of a public right of way, the character of a public office, the boundaries of a village — the very fact that a competent court reached a conclusion on that matter carries some evidentiary weight in a later case. Section 36 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) makes such judgments relevant, but stops short of the conclusiveness that Section 35 gives to probate, matrimonial, admiralty, and insolvency decrees.
36. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 35. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 35 are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry; but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.
Illustration.
A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies. The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land, in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.
Section 36 reproduces Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) without any change in wording. The BPRD BSA-to-IEA correspondence table records "No change." Its role is to give some evidentiary status — but not conclusive status — to judgments touching public-nature matters.
The two-part test
For a judgment to be relevant under Section 36, it must satisfy two conditions read together:
The words "of a public nature" are doing the heavy lifting. A judgment in a purely private dispute between two neighbours over a boundary of their own land will not qualify, even if the same boundary comes up again in a later case. But a judgment establishing (or refusing to establish) a public right of way, a public thoroughfare, a village boundary, or the existence of a public office is on a matter of public nature and is admissible under this section.
Relevant, but not conclusive
The section's second sentence is as important as the first: such judgments "are not conclusive proof of that which they state." This is the crucial contrast with Section 35. A probate decree operating under Section 35(2) is conclusive proof of the specified matters against all the world; a public-nature judgment under Section 36 is merely evidence that the court may weigh. The party against whom it is tendered may lead contrary evidence, may show that the earlier decree was wrong on the merits, and may invite the current court to reach a different conclusion. Section 36 puts the earlier judgment on the scales; it does not decide the outcome.
The illustration in detail
The single illustration is worth reading carefully because it captures the section's operation precisely. A sues B for trespass on A's land. B's defence is that a public right of way runs over the land. There was an earlier suit between A and C — the same right of way was in issue — and the court decreed in C's favour, effectively recognising the right of way. Under Section 36, that earlier decree is relevant in A's current suit against B, because it concerns a public-nature matter (a right of way benefiting the public) that is relevant to the current enquiry. It is not, however, conclusive: A may still show that the right of way does not exist, and the current court may reach its own conclusion. B has the benefit of an earlier decision that trended in his favour; A retains the right to attempt to displace it.
Where Section 36 fits in the cluster
| Section | Class of judgment | Evidentiary effect |
|---|---|---|
| 34 | Judgments that bar a second suit or trial by law (res judicata / autrefois acquit or convict) | Relevant to the jurisdictional question |
| 35 | Probate, matrimonial, admiralty, insolvency judgments | Conclusive proof of specified matters |
| 36 | Public-nature judgments (other than Section 35) | Relevant but not conclusive |
| 37 | All other judgments | Irrelevant unless existence is a fact in issue or relevance arises under another provision |
| 38 | Any judgment relevant under 34–36 | Effect may be defeated by proof of fraud, collusion, or incompetence |
Why "relevant but not conclusive" is the right calibration
Public-nature matters — rights of way, public boundaries, public offices — tend to have effects that extend beyond the parties to a single case. A judgment recognising a public right of way, for example, will practically bind everyone who wants to use or challenge that way. But the earlier case did not have every affected member of the public before it, so treating the judgment as conclusive against later parties (who never had a chance to be heard) would be unjust. Section 36's calibration — relevant, but not conclusive — respects that reality. It gives weight to the earlier ruling without turning it into a decree operating against the world.
Unchanged from Section 42 IEA
The BPRD table records "No change" for Section 36. The provision has been carried over from Section 42 IEA verbatim. Case law developed under Section 42 IEA — on what counts as a matter of a public nature, and on the appropriate weight of such judgments in later litigation — continues to guide the interpretation of Section 36 BSA.
Key Takeaways
- Two-part test: the judgment must fall outside Section 35 and must relate to a matter of a public nature relevant to the current enquiry.
- Relevant, not conclusive: the earlier judgment is evidence the court may weigh, not a binding determination.
- Public-nature matters: rights of way, public offices, boundaries, public thoroughfares — private-only disputes do not qualify.
- Illustration: a prior decree recognising a public right of way is relevant, but not conclusive, in a later trespass suit involving the same way.
- Unchanged from Section 42 IEA: the provision is carried over verbatim.
Conclusion
Section 36 fills the middle ground of the judgment-relevancy cluster. It is stronger than Section 37, which excludes most other judgments, but weaker than Section 35, which makes specialised judgments conclusive. That middle ground is exactly right for judgments on public-nature matters: they carry real weight, because they concern rights and facts that affect more than the parties before the earlier court, but they cannot be conclusive against later parties who had no opportunity to be heard in that earlier proceeding. Reproduced from Section 42 of the 1872 Act without change, the section remains a working part of the BSA's careful architecture for the evidentiary use of past judgments.