Introduction
A tenant accepts the keys, moves in, pays rent for years — and then, once a possession dispute begins, suddenly claims the landlord never actually owned the property at all. Courts have refused to entertain that argument for over a century. What changed in 2023 is not the principle, but exactly when it stops applying.
Section 122 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) continues this run through Chapter VIII ("Of Estoppel"), following Section 123's estoppel of the acceptor, bailee, and licensee published earlier in this run. Section 122 applies the same underlying logic to the most litigated estoppel relationship in Indian property law: landlord and tenant. It also contains a small but genuinely significant textual addition that has already been the subject of a 2026 Delhi High Court ruling — a change worth reading carefully, because it is easy to miss on a first pass.
122. Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.
No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy or any time thereafter, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.
Section 122 BSA vs. Section 116 IEA: The Three Words That Changed
Practitioners who know Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, from memory will read Section 122 and, at first glance, see the same rule. Look again at the phrase "during the continuance of the tenancy" — Section 122 adds "or any time thereafter" immediately after it, a phrase that does not appear in the 1872 text at all. This is a confirmed, substantive drafting change, not a stylistic one: it directly expands how long the estoppel actually lasts.
| Aspect | Section 116, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 | Section 122, BSA, 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Duration of tenant's estoppel | "During the continuance of the tenancy" | "During the continuance of the tenancy or any time thereafter" — added |
| Licensee-of-possession clause | Cannot deny title at time licence was given | Identical, unchanged |
| Who is bound | Tenant and those claiming through the tenant | Identical, unchanged |
Before 2023, the words "during the continuance of the tenancy" left open an argument: once the tenancy legally ends — by notice, expiry, or otherwise — does the estoppel end with it, freeing a former tenant to dispute the landlord's original title? Courts had already leaned against that reading through case law, but the statute itself did not say so explicitly. Section 122 now closes that gap in the text directly.
The Judicial Backstory: Estoppel Never Really Stopped at "Continuance"
The Privy Council addressed this exact question long before the BSA existed. In Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR 1915 PC 96, it was held that a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny the landlord's title, however defective, so long as the tenant continues in possession and has not surrendered it back to the landlord — meaning the estoppel tracked actual possession, not the formal end date of the tenancy agreement. A Calcutta High Court ruling reiterating the same principle in December 2022, shortly before the BSA was enacted, confirmed that the estoppel remains in effect "as long as the licensee or sub-tenant either has not openly restored possession" — eviction or voluntary surrender of possession, not mere contractual termination, marks the true endpoint.
Section 122's "or any time thereafter" can be read as the legislature writing this settled judicial gloss directly into the statute, removing any residual argument that the bare words of the old Section 116 supported a narrower reading than the courts had already adopted.
Mohd. Anis v. Yasmeen: Section 122 Applied
In Mohd. Anis v. Ms. Yasmeen, RFA 511/2026, the Delhi High Court (Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, 25 May 2026) dismissed a tenant's Regular First Appeal against a trial court decree that had granted the landlord possession, arrears of rent, and mesne profits with interest. The trial court had decreed the suit on 19 March 2026. The High Court's ruling confirmed the now-familiar principle in explicit BSA terms: a tenant inducted by a landlord is estopped from challenging that landlord's title under Section 122, reinforcing that this defence remains a losing one for tenants seeking to delay lawful possession proceedings.
A related 2025 Delhi High Court ruling, Naseem Ahmed v. Deepak Singh (Justices Prathiba M. Singh and Shail Jain), dismissed a similar tenant appeal on the same underlying principle, holding that a tenant cannot dispute the landlord's title during the tenancy — even where forgery is alleged — unless that allegation is backed by credible evidence, not bare assertion.
The Second Limb: The Licensee of a Person in Possession
Section 122's second clause runs in parallel to the tenant rule but covers a different relationship: a person who comes onto immovable property under a licence granted by whoever is currently in possession of it. That licensee cannot later deny that the licensor had a title to that possession at the moment the licence was granted. Unlike the tenant clause, this half of the section was not amended — it carries the "at the time when such licence was given" language over from 1872 unchanged, without an equivalent "or any time thereafter" extension.
Worked Example One: A Tenant Disputes Title After Eviction Proceedings Begin
A landlord initiates eviction proceedings against a tenant who has occupied a shop for eight years under a lease that expired eighteen months ago, with the tenant continuing to hold over. The tenant argues that, because the formal lease term ended, the tenant is now free to argue the landlord never had proper title to the shop at all. Under Section 122, this argument fails — the estoppel covers "any time thereafter," so the expiry of the formal lease term does not open the door to disputing the landlord's original title, so long as the tenant has not actually surrendered possession.
Worked Example Two: A Licensee's Narrower Estoppel
A person is granted a licence to use a portion of a warehouse by the party in possession of it. Years later, after the licence has been revoked and the licensee has left the property entirely, a dispute arises over an unrelated transaction between the same parties. The licensee seeks to argue that the original licensor never had a valid right to possession when the licence was granted. Because this limb of Section 122 was not extended with "any time thereafter," the estoppel's exact temporal reach depends on the specific facts and timing — a narrower, more literally-worded rule than the tenant clause sitting right beside it.
Why This Matters in Practice
For landlords and their counsel, Section 122 removes a delaying tactic that tenants have long attempted at the tail end of a tenancy or during eviction proceedings: waiting until the lease term technically lapses and then disputing title as if starting from a clean slate. For tenants and their counsel, the section makes clear that the only route out of the estoppel is proving actual surrender or eviction from possession — not merely pointing to the calendar date the tenancy agreement expired. For anyone drafting or litigating a licence over immovable property, the section is a reminder that Chapter VIII's estoppel provisions are not uniformly worded, and each clause's precise temporal scope has to be checked on its own terms.
Key Takeaways
- Confirmed substantive change: Section 122 BSA adds "or any time thereafter" to the tenant-estoppel clause inherited from Section 116 IEA — a genuine expansion, not a stylistic edit.
- The addition largely codifies a judicial position already established in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR 1915 PC 96: the estoppel tracks actual possession, not the formal tenancy end date.
- Mohd. Anis v. Ms. Yasmeen, RFA 511/2026 (Delhi HC, 25 May 2026), directly applies Section 122 to bar a tenant from disputing title after eviction proceedings began.
- Naseem Ahmed v. Deepak Singh (2025, Delhi HC) confirms that even a forgery allegation cannot defeat the estoppel without credible supporting evidence.
- The licensee-of-possession clause was left unchanged — its estoppel remains anchored to the moment the licence was granted, unlike the tenant clause's open-ended extension.
Conclusion
Section 122 shows that the BSA's changes are not always cosmetic renumbering of the Indian Evidence Act — sometimes three added words carry real legal weight, closing an argument tenants had tried for over a century and giving courts explicit statutory footing for a rule they had already built through cases like Bilas Kunwar. Having covered the acceptor-and-bailee estoppel in Section 123 and the tenant-and-licensee estoppel here in Section 122, this run now turns to Section 121 — the general estoppel provision that both of these specific applications rest on.