Introduction
"You saw the accused stab the victim, didn't you?" Any lawyer who has sat through a trial recognises this kind of question instantly — it doesn't ask the witness to recall what happened, it hands them the answer and invites agreement. Whether a question like this is fair game or an improper shortcut depends entirely on one thing: which stage of examination it is asked in.
Section 146 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), in Chapter X ("Of the Examination of Witnesses"), defines the leading question and sets out exactly when one may and may not be asked. It is also a notable piece of drafting in its own right — a single, cleanly numbered section that consolidates what used to be spread across three separate provisions of the old Evidence Act. This article walks through all four subsections, the consolidation behind them, and two Supreme Court rulings — one nearly three decades old, one from December 2025 — that show how this rule plays out in real trials.
146. Leading questions.
(1) Any question suggesting the answer which the person putting it wishes or expects to receive, is called a leading question.
(2) Leading questions must not, if objected to by the adverse party, be asked in an examination-in-chief, or in a re-examination, except with the permission of the Court.
(3) The Court shall permit leading questions as to matters which are introductory or undisputed, or which have, in its opinion, been already sufficiently proved.
(4) Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination.
The Four Subsections, One at a Time
Subsection (1) supplies the definition that everything else depends on: a leading question is one that suggests, within its own wording, the answer the questioner wants. It is not defined by tone or aggression — a perfectly polite question can still be leading if it embeds the desired answer.
Subsection (2) is the restriction: in examination-in-chief (when a party questions its own witness) and in re-examination (the follow-up round after cross-examination), a leading question cannot be asked over the adverse party's objection unless the court permits it. The rule is not a blanket ban — it only bites once the other side objects, and even then the court retains discretion to allow it.
Subsection (3) narrows that discretion into a mandatory duty in three specific situations: the court shall permit leading questions on matters that are merely introductory, matters that are undisputed between the parties, or matters that the court considers already sufficiently proved. These are situations where the risk a leading question poses — putting words in the witness's mouth on a contested point — simply is not present.
Subsection (4) removes the restriction altogether for cross-examination, where leading questions are freely permitted. The rationale is structural: cross-examination exists precisely to test and challenge a witness who is presumed hostile to the cross-examiner's case, so there is no risk of the lawyer coaching a friendly witness toward a rehearsed answer.
A Notable Piece of Drafting: Three Old Sections Become One
Section 146 is a good illustration of the BSA's broader drafting approach. Under the old Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), the same subject matter was spread across three separate, consecutively numbered sections: Section 141 (the bare definition of a leading question), Section 142 (when leading questions must not be asked, including the introductory/undisputed/sufficiently-proved carve-outs), and Section 143 (the standalone rule that leading questions may be asked in cross-examination). The BSA folds all three into a single Section 146, with each former section becoming one or two numbered subsections.
This is a structural consolidation, not a substantive rewrite — the wording of each rule is carried forward essentially unchanged. But it is a meaningful drafting choice worth flagging for practitioners: a single-section citation now covers ground that previously required citing three different IEA provisions together.
| BSA, 2023 | Content | IEA, 1872 Equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| Section 146(1) | Definition of a leading question | Section 141 |
| Section 146(2)–(3) | Restriction in chief/re-examination, plus mandatory exceptions | Section 142 |
| Section 146(4) | Free use in cross-examination | Section 143 |
Why the Restriction Exists: Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala
The Supreme Court explained the stakes of subsection (2)'s restriction plainly in Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, holding that a prosecutor should not be permitted to frame questions that a witness can answer with a mere "yes" or "no," structured so as to elicit exactly the answer the prosecutor wants. The Court went further, holding that allowing this kind of leading questioning in examination-in-chief would offend the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution — elevating what might look like a narrow procedural rule into a constitutional safeguard against a witness being coached, in effect, from the well of the court.
Leading Questions in Cross-Examination Keep Full Weight: K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph (2025)
A December 2025 Supreme Court ruling, K.S. Dinachandran v. Shyla Joseph, confirms that subsection (4)'s freedom for cross-examination is not merely permissive — an answer obtained through a leading question in cross-examination carries exactly the same probative value as one obtained any other way. The case involved a disputed 1988 will where an attesting witness's examination-in-chief left a gap about who else had signed the document; that gap was filled during cross-examination, in response to a leading question from the opposing party. A lower court had discounted that answer specifically because it came from a leading question. The Supreme Court reversed, holding squarely that leading questions are permitted in cross-examination and the answers they elicit are not entitled to lesser weight for that reason alone.
Read together, Varkey Joseph and Dinachandran map neatly onto Section 146's own structure: the restriction in subsection (2) exists because leading a friendly witness risks manufactured testimony, while the freedom in subsection (4) exists precisely because no such risk attaches when the questioner is testing an opposing witness — and courts should credit the answers accordingly, not discount them.
Worked Examples
Example 1 — Improperly Leading in Chief
In examination-in-chief, the prosecution asks its own eyewitness, "The accused was holding the knife when you saw him, correct?" — on a contested, central fact. If defence counsel objects, the court must disallow the question unless it falls within one of subsection (3)'s carve-outs; here, since the identity of the weapon-holder is squarely disputed, none of them apply.
Example 2 — Permitted Under Subsection (3)
The same prosecutor asks the same witness, "You live at 14 Park Street, don't you?" — a purely introductory, undisputed fact establishing the witness's address. Even if objected to, the court should permit this question under subsection (3), since it is introductory and not genuinely in dispute.
Example 3 — Leading in Cross-Examination
Defence counsel, cross-examining the same witness, asks, "Isn't it true that it was too dark to clearly see who was holding anything?" This is plainly leading, but subsection (4) permits it without restriction — and following Dinachandran, any answer elicited carries full evidentiary weight, not a discounted one.
Section 146 Alongside Section 149: Form vs. Subject Matter
Section 146 governs the form of a question — whether it improperly suggests its own answer. Section 149 BSA (covered elsewhere in this series) governs a completely different axis: the permissible subject matter of cross-examination questions, including veracity, identity, and character. A single cross-examination question can be tested against both provisions at once — it may be leading (freely allowed under Section 146(4)) while also needing to satisfy Section 149's subject-matter boundaries, including its absolute rape-shield proviso. The two sections operate independently and a question must clear both, where applicable, to be proper.
Who Section 146 Actually Affects
- Trial lawyers questioning their own witnesses must frame open, non-suggestive questions on contested facts during examination-in-chief, reserving leading questions for introductory or undisputed ground.
- Cross-examining counsel retain complete freedom to use leading questions, and can rely on Dinachandran to insist that answers they elicit are given full weight.
- Trial judges must apply subsection (3)'s mandatory exceptions correctly, since refusing a properly introductory or undisputed leading question is itself an error.
- Appellate courts reviewing witness credibility findings must not discount testimony merely because it emerged from a leading question in cross-examination, per Dinachandran.
- Defence counsel in criminal trials should object promptly to improper leading questions in chief, since Varkey Joseph frames the harm as a fair-trial concern, not a mere technicality.
Key Takeaways
- A leading question is defined by its wording, not its tone: any question that suggests the desired answer qualifies, however politely phrased.
- The restriction is objection-triggered, not automatic: leading questions in chief or re-examination are barred only once the adverse party objects, subject to the court's discretion.
- Three situations override the restriction as a matter of duty: introductory, undisputed, or already sufficiently proved matters must be allowed even over objection.
- Cross-examination is a leading-question free zone: subsection (4) removes the restriction entirely, and Dinachandran (2025) confirms the resulting answers keep full probative value.
- Section 146 consolidates three old IEA sections into one: Sections 141, 142, and 143 of the 1872 Act now live together as Section 146's four subsections, unchanged in substance.
Conclusion
Section 146 answers a question every trial lawyer asks dozens of times a day without necessarily thinking about the rule behind it: can I phrase it this way? The answer turns entirely on who is being questioned and at what stage — a friendly witness in chief needs protection from having answers put in their mouth, while an opposing witness on cross-examination gets no such protection, because testing rather than coaching is the entire point of that exercise.
Varkey Joseph shows why the restriction matters as a matter of constitutional fairness, and Dinachandran, decided barely months before this article, confirms that the freedom on the other side of the rule is not a second-class kind of evidence — a leading question's answer in cross-examination stands on exactly the same footing as any other. Together, the two cases bookend Section 146's logic almost perfectly.