Introduction
A witness is asked a question that is genuinely relevant to the case — but answering it truthfully would incriminate them. Can they simply refuse, the way an accused person can invoke the right to stay silent? For an ordinary witness, the answer is no — and the reason lies in a short cross-reference that connects two provisions doing very different jobs.
Section 150 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), in Chapter X ("Of the Examination of Witnesses"), is one of the shortest provisions in this entire cluster — a single sentence that does nothing but point to another section. But what it points to, Section 137, is one of the more consequential rules in the entire Act: the provision that strips witnesses of any general privilege against self-incrimination while handing them a real, if limited, immunity in exchange. This article — the final piece in this run through Sections 159 down to 150 — explains how that cross-reference works, and why it matters that this protection is statutory, not constitutional.
150. When witness to be compelled to answer.
If any such question relates to a matter relevant to the suit or proceeding, the provisions of section 137 shall apply thereto.
137. Witness not excused from answering on ground that answer will criminate.
A witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind:
Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.
Section 150 Explained: A Fork in the Road, Not a Rule of Its Own
Section 150 is best understood alongside Section 151, its immediate neighbour and the natural continuation of the same underlying question. Both provisions deal with what happens when a witness is asked a difficult question during cross-examination — but they split down two entirely different tracks depending on one threshold issue: is the question relevant to the actual case?
If the question is relevant to the suit or proceeding, Section 150 applies, and it does only one thing: it routes the situation to Section 137. There is no discretion, no balancing test — a relevant question triggers the strong compulsion-with-immunity regime set out there. If the question is not relevant, and only bears on the witness's credit, Section 151's more nuanced four-factor discretionary framework takes over instead.
What Section 137 Actually Does: Compulsion Paired With Immunity
Section 137 makes a striking statement: a witness cannot refuse to answer a relevant question merely because the truthful answer would incriminate them, or expose them to a penalty or forfeiture. There is no general privilege against self-incrimination available to a witness in this position — the question must be answered.
But the section does not leave the witness exposed. Its proviso creates a real, if carefully bounded, protection: an answer a witness is compelled to give under this compulsion cannot itself be used to arrest or prosecute them, and cannot be proved against them in any criminal proceeding — with one specific exception, a prosecution for giving false evidence through that very answer.
Why This Is a Statutory Shield, Not a Constitutional One
It is tempting to see Section 137's immunity as simply the statutory face of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects a person accused of an offence from being compelled to be a witness against themselves. But the two operate on entirely different footing, and the distinction matters enormously in practice.
Article 20(3) is narrow by design — it protects only a person who is formally an accused, and only against being compelled to testify against themselves in their own prosecution. It says nothing about an ordinary witness testifying in someone else's case, or even a party to a civil suit answering questions unrelated to a criminal charge against them personally. Section 137 fills exactly that gap, extending a version of the same underlying protection — freedom from being incriminated by one's own compelled testimony — to witnesses generally, who have no constitutional privilege to fall back on at all.
The Limits of the Immunity: "Qualified," Not Absolute
The Supreme Court has been clear that Section 137's predecessor under the old Act grants only a qualified privilege, not blanket immunity. The protection stops a witness's own compelled, incriminating answer from being used against them — but it does not shield the witness from prosecution altogether if independent, substantial evidence of their involvement exists from other sources. In other words, the compelled answer itself is off-limits as evidence; everything else the prosecution can prove independently remains fully available.
Worked Example: A Witness Compelled to Admit a Side Deal
Consider a commercial dispute where a witness, testifying about the central transaction in the case, is asked a relevant question that requires them to admit to a separate, undisclosed side arrangement that itself violated a regulatory rule. The question bears directly on the transaction at issue — it is relevant, so Section 150 applies, routing the matter to Section 137. The witness must answer despite the self-incriminating nature of the admission.
Section 150 BSA vs. Section 147 IEA: The Rule Is Unchanged
Section 150 corresponds to Section 147 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), and its cross-reference target — Section 137 BSA — corresponds to Section 132 IEA. Both provisions carry forward unchanged in substance.
| Element | IEA, 1872 | BSA, 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Relevant-question cross-reference | Section 147, pointing to Section 132 | Section 150, pointing to Section 137 (renumbered, same substance) |
| Compulsion-with-immunity rule | Present in Section 132 | Unchanged in Section 137 |
Because both provisions are substantively unchanged, the Supreme Court's guidance on the qualified nature of this immunity — including the limits discussed above — applies with full force under the BSA.
Who Section 150 Actually Affects
- Any witness asked a relevant, self-incriminating question should understand they cannot refuse to answer on that basis alone — but that the specific answer compelled from them carries real, if limited, protection.
- Advocates conducting examination can press relevant questions with confidence that a witness has no general escape route, once relevance is established.
- Prosecutors and regulators must be careful not to rely on a witness's Section 137-compelled testimony itself as evidence against that witness, while remaining free to use independently obtained evidence of the same conduct.
- Trial judges must correctly classify a question as relevant (triggering Section 150 and Section 137) versus merely credit-related (triggering Section 151's separate framework), since the two tracks offer very different protections.
- Litigants and their counsel should recognise that this statutory immunity is distinct from, and narrower in some ways than, an accused's constitutional protection under Article 20(3).
Key Takeaways
- Section 150 is a routing provision, not a standalone rule: it sends every relevant question straight to Section 137's compulsion-with-immunity framework.
- Witnesses have no general privilege to refuse relevant questions: self-incrimination alone is not a valid ground to decline to answer.
- The immunity is real but qualified: the compelled answer itself is shielded from use, but independent evidence of the same conduct remains fully available.
- This is a statutory protection, not Article 20(3): the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies only to an accused person, leaving witnesses to rely entirely on this statutory scheme instead.
- The rule is unchanged from 1872: Section 150 BSA and its Section 137 cross-reference carry forward Sections 147 and 132 IEA without substantive modification.
Conclusion
Section 150 is barely a rule in its own right — it is a signpost, pointing every relevant, potentially self-incriminating question toward Section 137's compulsion-with-immunity regime. But that signpost matters enormously in practice, because it forecloses any argument that a witness can simply refuse to answer a relevant question on self-incrimination grounds. What the law offers instead is narrower and more precise: the specific answer a witness is compelled to give cannot be turned against them, even though the underlying facts it reveals are not otherwise placed beyond reach.
This closes the run of ten articles through Sections 159 down to 150 — from corroboration and impeachment through the mandatory and discretionary limits on how a witness may be questioned, down to the compulsion-and-immunity rule that underlies the whole cluster. Together, these provisions form one of the most tightly reasoned parts of the BSA's examination-of-witnesses chapter, and understanding them as a connected system, rather than ten isolated rules, is what makes them usable in practice.