Introduction
Section 151 lets a court decide whether a witness must answer a question that only affects their character, not the facts of the case. But that raises an earlier, more basic question: should a lawyer even be allowed to ask it in the first place, on nothing more than a guess?
Section 152 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), in Chapter X ("Of the Examination of Witnesses"), answers that question with a threshold rule: a credit-impeaching question of this kind should not be asked at all unless the advocate has reasonable grounds for believing the imputation it carries is actually well-founded. This article walks through what counts as reasonable grounds, using the bare Act's own set of illustrations — still built around the classic "is this witness a dacoit" scenario — and why this threshold matters before a single question is ever put to a witness.
152. Question not to be asked without reasonable grounds.
No such question as is referred to in section 151 ought to be asked, unless the person asking it has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation which it conveys is well-founded.
Illustrations
(a) An advocate is instructed by another advocate that an important witness is a dacoit. This is a reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.
(b) An advocate is informed by a person in Court that an important witness is a dacoit. The informant, on being questioned by the advocate, gives satisfactory reasons for his statement. This is a reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dacoit.
(c) A witness, of whom nothing whatever is known, is asked at random whether he is a dacoit. There are here no reasonable grounds for the question.
(d) A witness, of whom nothing whatever is known, being questioned as to his mode of life and means of living, gives unsatisfactory answers. This may be a reasonable ground for asking him if he is a dacoit.
Section 152 Explained: A Threshold Before the Question, Not After
Section 152 operates at a different moment than Section 151. Section 151 governs what happens once a non-relevant, credit-only question has already been asked — whether the witness must answer it. Section 152 governs the earlier decision: whether the advocate was entitled to ask it at all. The standard is "reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation which it conveys is well-founded" — not certainty, not proof, but a genuine, articulable basis for believing the accusation carries some truth.
This threshold exists because a credit-impeaching question, by its nature, damages a witness the moment it is asked — the imputation lands in the courtroom record regardless of how the witness answers. Section 152 is designed to stop that damage from being inflicted on pure speculation.
What Counts as "Reasonable Grounds": The Four Illustrations
The bare Act's own illustrations — all built around asking a witness whether they are a "dacoit," using the historical Indian legal term for an armed robber or member of a robber gang — remain the clearest guide to where the line actually falls.
The Common Thread: Genuine Basis, Not Investigation Standard
What separates illustrations (a), (b), and (d) from (c) is not the strength of proof — none of them come close to establishing the imputation as fact. What separates them is whether there is any articulable reason at all behind the question. A tip from a colleague, a verified informant, or a witness's own suspicious answers all clear this bar; pure speculation about a stranger does not.
This is deliberately a low bar compared to, say, the standard needed to actually prove an allegation. Section 152 does not require the advocate to already have evidence sufficient to establish the imputation — only a genuine, non-arbitrary reason for believing it might be true. The question itself, and the witness's answer to it, is how the matter gets tested; Section 152 simply ensures that testing process does not begin from nothing.
Section 152's Place in the Sequence — and Its Enforcement
Section 152 does not operate alone. It sets the standard that Section 151 presupposes when the Court decides whether an already-asked question must be answered, and it is the standard whose violation triggers Section 153's power to report an advocate to their professional regulator.
| Provision | Moment It Applies |
|---|---|
| Section 152 | Before the question is asked — sets the reasonable-grounds threshold |
| Section 151 | After the question is asked — whether the witness must answer it |
| Section 153 | After the trial court forms its opinion — whether to report an advocate who violated the Section 152 standard |
Section 152 BSA vs. Section 149 IEA: Substance and Illustrations Unchanged
Section 152 corresponds to Section 149 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), carried forward with the same reasonable-grounds standard and the same four dacoit illustrations.
| Element | IEA, 1872 (Section 149) | BSA, 2023 (Section 152) |
|---|---|---|
| Reasonable-grounds standard | Present | Unchanged |
| Four dacoit illustrations | Present | Carried forward unchanged |
Because the standard and its illustrations are unchanged, the settled body of Indian case law on what counts as a reasonable ground for a credit-impeaching question applies directly to Section 152 practice under the BSA.
Who Section 152 Actually Affects
- Cross-examining advocates must be able to articulate their basis for a credit-impeaching question before asking it, not merely justify it after the fact.
- Instructing advocates and clients who pass along information about a witness's character should expect that information to be tested, as in illustration (b), before it is put to the witness.
- Witnesses gain real, if imperfect, protection against being accused of serious misconduct purely on a stranger's guess.
- Trial judges assessing whether to report an advocate under Section 153 will look back to whether the Section 152 threshold was genuinely met.
- Appellate courts reviewing the fairness of cross-examination may examine whether a credit-impeaching question had the reasonable grounds this section requires.
Key Takeaways
- The threshold applies before the question is asked: Section 152 is about whether an advocate was entitled to ask, not just whether the witness had to answer.
- The standard is a genuine basis, not proof: reasonable grounds is a lower bar than establishing the imputation is true.
- Grounds can come from multiple sources: professional instruction, a tested informant's tip, or even a witness's own evasive answers during questioning.
- Pure speculation about a stranger fails the standard: illustration (c) remains the clearest example of what Section 152 forbids.
- The rule is unchanged from 1872: Section 152 BSA carries forward Section 149 IEA, including all four illustrations, without substantive modification.
Conclusion
Section 152 protects witnesses from being accused, in open court, purely on a guess — while still leaving real room for advocates to test genuine suspicions, however they arise. The bare Act's own illustrations do the real work of defining the line: a colleague's instruction, a verified tip, or a witness's own evasiveness all clear the bar; a question pulled from thin air does not.
For advocates, the discipline the section demands is simple to state: know your basis before you ask, and be ready to explain it if challenged. Section 152 does not ask for certainty — only for a genuine reason, honestly held, before a witness's character is put in question.