Section 59 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) lays down the rule: documents must be proved by primary evidence. Section 60 is the list of doors out of that rule. It sets out, exhaustively, the situations in which a party may prove a document by secondary evidence instead — a copy, an oral account, a certified extract — because the original genuinely cannot be placed before the court. Read together, the two sections express the best evidence rule and its measured exceptions: prefer the original, but do not let the preference defeat justice when the original is honestly out of reach.
60. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases, namely: —
(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power—
(i) of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved; or
(ii) of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court; or
(iii) of any person legally bound to produce it,
and when, after the notice mentioned in section 64 such person does not produce it;
(b) when the existence, condition or contents of the original have been proved to be admitted in writing by the person against whom it is proved or by his representative in interest;
(c) when the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
(d) when the original is of such a nature as not to be easily movable;
(e) when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74;
(f) when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Adhiniyam, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence;
(g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot conveniently be examined in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection.
Explanation.—For the purposes of—
(i) clauses (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents of the document is admissible;
(ii) clause (b), the written admission is admissible;
(iii) clause (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible;
(iv) clause (g), evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such document.
What changed from Section 65 of the 1872 Act
Section 60 reproduces Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) in substance. The seven cases and the Explanation are the same. The recodification made two small drafting refinements: the word "namely" was added to the opening line, tightening the sense that the list is a defined set; and the three limbs of clause (a) — possession by the adverse party, by a person out of the court's reach, or by a person legally bound to produce — were formally numbered as sub-clauses (i), (ii), and (iii), which in the 1872 text ran together as an unbroken paragraph. Neither change alters the law. They make an already-dense provision easier to read and cite.
Seven gateways, and the evidence each one permits
The most important practical feature of Section 60 is that it does not treat all seven cases alike. The Explanation calibrates the kind of secondary evidence that each case admits. In three situations any secondary evidence will do; in others, only a specific form — a written admission, or a certified copy — is allowed. Getting this mapping wrong is a common way to have otherwise-relevant evidence excluded.
| Case | When it applies | Secondary evidence allowed |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Original held by the adverse party, a person beyond the court's reach, or one legally bound to produce it — and, after notice under Section 64, not produced | Any secondary evidence |
| (b) | Contents admitted in writing by the adverse party | The written admission only |
| (c) | Original destroyed or lost, or not producible in reasonable time for a reason free of the party's own default | Any secondary evidence |
| (d) | Original not easily movable | Any secondary evidence |
| (e) | Original is a public document within Section 74 | Certified copy only |
| (f) | Original is a document for which a certified copy is permitted by law | Certified copy only |
| (g) | Numerous accounts or documents that cannot conveniently be examined in court | The general result, spoken to by a skilled examiner |
Foundational facts must come first
Across every clause, the Supreme Court has insisted that a party cannot simply produce a copy and assert that one of these cases applies. The factual foundation for the exception must be proved before the secondary evidence is received. In Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664, the Court declined to admit a photostat copy where the conditions of Section 65(a) IEA had not been made out — the appellant had not established that the original was in the opposite party's possession and had not been produced after notice. The exception is available only when its own factual trigger is proved.
That discipline was applied in a modern setting in Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh, (2020) 5 SCC 178. A party sought to prove a copy of a Will as secondary evidence because the original could not be retrieved. The Court held that where the foundational facts — that the original once existed and is now lost or otherwise unavailable through no fault of the party — are established, the party must be allowed to lead secondary evidence; but the mere marking of a document as an exhibit is not proof, and the foundation cannot be skipped. The two decisions, forty-five years apart, make the same point: Section 60 opens a gateway, but only to a litigant who has first proved they are entitled to walk through it.
Key Takeaways
- The exceptions to Section 59: Section 60 lists the seven cases in which a document may be proved by secondary evidence rather than the original.
- Minor drafting changes only: "namely" was added and clause (a) was split into sub-clauses (i)–(iii); the law is unchanged from Section 65 IEA.
- The kind of evidence is calibrated: the Explanation allows any secondary evidence for clauses (a), (c) and (d), but only a certified copy for (e) and (f) and only the written admission for (b).
- Clause (a) needs a Section 64 notice: it is the sole gateway with a procedural precondition.
- Prove the foundation first: per Ashok Dulichand and Jagmail Singh, the factual trigger for the exception must be established before secondary evidence is admitted.
Conclusion
Section 60 is the working heart of the secondary-evidence scheme. It defines precisely when the law will accept something less than the original, and — through its Explanation — exactly what that something may be. Carried forward from Section 65 of the 1872 Act with only cosmetic refinements, it continues to demand that a litigant earn the exception by proving its factual basis, whether that basis is loss, immovability, an adverse party's non-production after notice, or the sheer volume of the records. The provision rewards preparation: identify the correct clause, prove its trigger, and offer the form of secondary evidence that clause actually permits.